According to Evidential Pluralism, mechanistic studies should be scrutinised alongside comparative studies when evaluating a causal claim. This leads to new approaches to evidence-based medicine and evidence-based policy making, for example. Talks in this series consider Evidential Pluralism and/or alternative approaches to handling diversity of evidence in causal enquiry.

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2025

20 March, 4-5.30pm. Gary Goertz (Notre Dame) & Stephan Haggard (UCSD). Evidential Pluralism: The Example of Multi-method Large-N Qualitative analysis.

In other work, we have explored methodological issues around a research approach we call Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA). The core of the method combines a consideration of regularities and within-case causal inference of all cases falling within a specified scope. In this talk, we outline a particular variant of this approach: multimethod LNQA or M-LNQA. The distinctive feature of M-LNQA is that it combines a statistical and LNQA component and thus raises interesting issues about evidential pluralism: how evidence of very different sorts can be combined to strengthen inference.

14 April, 3-4.30pm. Alexandra Trofimov (Manchester). How Evidential Pluralism mitigates epistemic injustice in evidence-based evaluation.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how Evidential Pluralism, an emerging account of the epistemology of causality, can help to avoid epistemic injustice in evidence-based evaluation. This, in turn, supports the adoption of Evidential Pluralism as a new methodology for evaluation. By prioritising certain kinds of evidence and devaluing or excluding other kinds of evidence, orthodox evidence-based approaches can lead to epistemic injustice. In contrast, by advocating a more inclusive approach to evidence, Evidential Pluralism is able to avoid the epistemic injustices committed by orthodox evidence-based approaches. These arguments are supported by consideration of three case studies concerning Covid-19 public face mask mandates, global value chains for development and consent to participate in non-pharmaceutical interventions.

14 May, 3-4.30pm. Christopher Clarke (Rotterdam). Against causal pluralism.

16 June, 2-3.30pm Phyllis Illari (UCL). Epistemic games and causal problems: a framework for teaching the evaluation of scientific information.

Studies in science education demonstrate that laypeople typically engage with science to meet situation-specific needs. Their interest in science often emerges only when it directly helps them solve a particular problem. However, most research in science education has focused on evaluating the trustworthiness of information and the level of understanding required for its use. Less attention has been given to assessing the appropriateness of scientific information for specific purposes while recognizing its limitations. This paper aims to address this gap by proposing a framework to help laypeople evaluate scientific information in a purpose-specific manner. The framework introduced in this paper is based on the philosophical classification of causal information and its relevance to four scientific problems: inference, explanation, prediction, and control. It categorizes causal information into two types of epistemic games used by scientists: difference makers search and production or mechanism search. By understanding these games, laypeople can better assess the merits and limitations of scientific information relative to their specific needs. The paper also offers insights into how this framework can be taught in educational settings, with a focus on genetics education as an example. The aim is to enhance students’ capacity to critically engage with scientific information, thereby improving their ability to make informed decisions based on the specific needs and challenges.

30 June. 3-4.30pm Federica Russo (Utrecht). How is Who. Evidence as Clues for Action in Participatory Research Interventions.

Participatory and collaborative approaches in sustainability science and public health research contribute to co-producing evidence that can support interventions by involving diverse societal actors that range from individual citizens to entire communities. However, existing philosophical accounts of evidence are not adequate to deal with the kind of evidence generated and used in such approaches. In this paper, we present an account of evidence as clues for action through participatory and collaborative research inspired by philosopher Susan Haack’s theory of evidence. Differently from most accounts of evidence for use in policies and interventions, our account combines action-oriented (the how) and actors-oriented (the who) considerations. We build on Haack’s theory and on the analysis of examples of participatory and collaborative research in sustainability science and public health research to flesh out six procedural criteria for the generation and mobilization of evidence in and from participatory research. Action-oriented criteria invite to look at evidence from a (a) foundherentist, (b) gradational and (c) quasi-holistic perspective. Actors-oriented criteria point out that evidence generation and utilization are (d) social, (e) personal, and (f) embedded. We suggest that these criteria may reinforce participatory and collaborative approaches to evidence co-production when addressing complex problems in sustainability science and public health allowing for the generation of a kind of practical objectivity.

21 July. 3-4.30pm Rosa Runhardt (Radboud). Evidential Pluralism and educational ethnography.

These seminars are organised by the team of the Interdisciplinary Systematic Review project in the Philosophy Department at the University of Manchester.